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     Michael Starks 
       ABSTRACT 
Probably the leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the ‘Two Selves’ operation 
of our personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical 
Enactivism’ and is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the 
Embodied Mind ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2nd and 3rd 
period writings (though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this). 
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve 
representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online 
papers ). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 which 
is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my 
reviews of Wittgenstein (who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (who called it The 
Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century which I have 
also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I 
won’t dwell on it here. 
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in 
favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment 
thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood 
in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is 
clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you don’t. Much clearer 
is Fodor’s characterization which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to 
content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the 
unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2. 
This is classic Hutto high level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad 
pretentious for the rest of us. I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin so can’t say how much of this text 
is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept 
up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top 
Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field. His discussions of the language games of “information” 
and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and 
Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but 
one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as 
philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is 
nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of standard approaches to cognitive science 
and philosophy of mind.” Yes and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize 
that W laid it all out with great (and unmatched) clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago. 
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I don’t see how one can lay the 
burden of explaining how the mind works at Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled 
contentful activities” etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds 
deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders of 
culture? Beginning and end of story. 
Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein and 
Searle, one has never lost it. And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I suggest 
mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, along of 
course with as much of 3rd period W as feasible, is an even better filter for folly. In sum an excellent book with 
various faults which I try to correct. 
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date framework for human behavior from the modern two systems view 
may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language as Revealed in 
Wittgenstein and Searle 59p(2016).  For all my articles on Wittgenstein and Searle see my e-book ‘The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Wittgenstein and Searle 367p (2016). Those 
interested in all my writings in their most recent versions may consult my e-book  Philosophy, Human Nature 
and the Collapse of Civilization  - Articles and Reviews 2006-2016  662p (2016). 
 
 
 
 
 "But I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness: nor do I have it because I am 
satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false."  
Wittgenstein OC 94 
 
"Now if it is not the causal connections which we are concerned with, then the activities of the mind lie open 
before us." Wittgenstein "The Blue Book" p6 (1933) 
 
"Nonsense, Nonsense, because you are making assumptions instead of simply describing. If your head is haunted 
by explanations here, you are neglecting to remind yourself of the most important facts." Wittgenstein Z 220 
 
"Philosophy simply puts everything before us and neither explains nor deduces anything...One might give the 
name `philosophy' to what is possible before all new discoveries and inventions." Wittgenstein PI 126 
 
"What we are supplying are really remarks on the natural history of man, not curiosities; however, but rather 
observations on facts which no one has doubted and which have only gone unremarked because they are always 
before our eyes." Wittgenstein RFM I p142 
 
"The aim of philosophy is to erect a wall at the point where language stops anyway." Wittgenstein Philosophical 
Occasions p187 
"The greatest danger here is wanting to observe oneself." LWPP1, 459 
 
"The limit of language is shown by its being impossible to describe a fact which corresponds to (is the translation 
of) a sentence without simply repeating the sentence (this has to do with the Kantian solution to the problem of 
philosophy)." Wittgenstein CV p10 (1931) 
“But you cannot explain a physical system such as a typewriter or a brain by identifying a pattern which it shares 
with its computational simulation, because the existence of the pattern does not explain how the system actually 
works as a physical system. …In sum, the fact that the attribution of syntax identifies no further causal powers is 
fatal to the claim that programs provide causal explanations of cognition… There is just a physical mechanism, the 
brain, with its various real physical and physical/mental causal levels of description.” Searle PNC p101-103   
 “Can there be reasons for action which are binding on a rational agent just in virtue of the nature of the fact 
reported in the reason statement, and independently of the agent’s desires, values, attitudes and 
evaluations?...The real paradox of the traditional discussion is that it tries to pose Hume’s guillotine, the rigid fact-
value distinction, in a vocabulary, the use of which already presupposes the falsity of the distinction.”   Searle PNC 
p165-171 
“…all status functions and hence all of institutional reality, with the exception of language, are created by speech 
acts that have the logical form of Declarations…the forms of the status function in question are almost invariably 
matters of deontic powers…to recognize something as a right, duty, obligation, requirement and so on is to 
recognize  a reason for action…these deontic structures make possible desire-independent reasons for action…The 
general point is very clear: the creation of the general field of desire-based reasons for action presupposed the 
acceptance of a system of desire-independent reasons for action.” Searle PNC p34-49 
“Some of the most important logical features of intentionality are beyond the reach of phenomenology because 
they have no immediate phenomenological reality… Because the creation of meaningfulness out of 
meaninglessness is not consciously experienced…it does not exist…This is… the phenomenological illusion.” Searle 
PNC p115-117 
“Consciousness is causally reducible to brain processes…and consciousness has no causal powers of its own in 
addition to the causal powers of the underlying neurobiology…But causal reducibility does not lead to ontological 
reducibility…consciousness only exists as experienced…and therefore it cannot be reduced to something that has a 
third person ontology, something that exists independently of experiences.” Searle PNC 155-6 
“…the basic intentional relation between the mind and the world has to do with conditions of satisfaction.  And a 
proposition is anything at all that can stand in an intentional relation to the world, and since those intentional 
relations always determine conditions of satisfaction, and a proposition is defined as anything sufficient to 
determine conditions of satisfactions, it turns out that all intentionality is a matter of propositions.” Searle PNC 
p193 
“Cognitive systems don’t  ‘pick  up’ or ‘take in’ any informational contents; there are no such things as 
informational contents to take in.”  Hutto RE pxvi 
Before commenting in detail on Radicalizing Enactivism (RE) I will first offer some comments on philosophy 
(descriptive psychology) and its relationship to contemporary psychological research as exemplified in the works of 
Searle (S) and Wittgenstein (W), since I feel that this is the best way to place any commentator on behavior in 
proper perspective.  
 
Wittgenstein is for me easily the most brilliant thinker on human behavior. His work as a whole shows that all 
behavior is an extension of innate true-only axioms and that our conscious ratiocination (now called System 2) (S2) 
emerges from unconscious machinations (System 1)(S1). See "On Certainty"(OC) for his final extended treatment 
of this idea-and my review thereof for preparation. His corpus can be seen as the foundation for all description of 
animal behavior, revealing how the mind works and indeed must work. The "must" is entailed by the fact that all 
brains share a common ancestry and common genes and so there is only one basic way they work, that this 
necessarily has an axiomatic structure, that all higher animals share the same evolved psychology based on 
inclusive fitness, and that in humans this is extended into a personality (a cognitive or phenomenological illusion) 
based on throat muscle contractions (language) that evolved to manipulate others (with variations that can be 
regarded as trivial). 
 
All of W's and S’s work as a development of or variation on these ideas. Another major theme here, and of course 
in all discussion of human behavior, is the need to separate the genetically programmed automatisms, which 
underlie all behavior, from the effects of culture. Though few philosophers, psychologists, anthropologists, 
sociologists etc., explicitly discuss this in a comprehensive way, it can be seen as the major problem they are 
dealing with. I suggest it will prove of the greatest value to consider all study of higher order behavior as an effort 
to tease apart not only fast and slow thinking (e.g., perceptions and other automatisms vs. dispositions- S1 and S2-
-see below), but nature and nurture. 
Because there is only ONE human psychology (for the same reason there is only ONE human cardiology), anyone 
accurately describing behavior must be voicing some variant or extension of what W and S have said and they 
should be easily translatable into one another. If not, one should be discarded and in my view that will rarely be W 
or S.  
 
What W laid out in his final period (and throughout his earlier work in a less clear way) are the foundations of 
evolutionary psychology (EP), or if you prefer, psychology, cognitive linguistics, intentionality, higher order thought 
or just animal behavior. Sadly, almost nobody seems to realize that his works are a unique textbook of descriptive 
psychology that is as relevant now as the day it was written. He is almost universally ignored by psychology and 
other behavioral sciences and humanities, and even those few who have more or less understood him, have not 
realized the extent of his anticipation of the latest work on EP and 
cognitive illusions (Theory of Mind, framing, the two selves of fast and slow thinking etc.,--see below). Searle’s 
work as a whole provides a stunning description of higher order social behavior that is possible because of the 
recent evolution of genes for dispositional  psychology, while the later W shows how it is based on true only 
unconscious axioms of S1 which evolved into conscious dispositional propositional thinking of S2. 
Long before Searle, W rejected the idea that the Bottom Up approaches of physiology, experimental psychology 
and computation (e.g., Behaviorism, Functionalism, Strong AI, DST, CTM, etc.) could reveal what his Top Down 
deconstructions of Language Games (LG's) did. The principal difficulties he noted are to understand what is always 
in front of our eyes (we can now see this as obliviousness to System 1 (roughly what S calls ‘the phenomenological 
illusion’) and to capture vagueness ("The greatest difficulty in these investigations is to find a way of representing 
vagueness" LWPP1, 347).  
As with his other aphorisms, I suggest one should take seriously W’s comment that even if God could look into our 
mind he could not see what we are thinking--this should be the motto of the Embodied Mind and, as S makes 
clear, of Cognitive Psychology. But God could see what we are perceiving and remembering and our reflexive 
thinking and acting, since these S1 functions are always causal mental states while S2 dispositions are only 
potentially CMS. I claim this is not a theory but a fact about our grammar and our physiology. S muddies the waters 
here because he sometimes refers to dispositions as mental states as well, but as W did long ago, he shows that 
the language of causality just does not apply to the higher order emergent S2 descriptions—again not a theory but 
a description about how language (thinking) works.  
Some of W's favorite topics in his later second and his third periods are the different (but interdigitating) LG's of 
fast and slow thinking (System 1 and 2 or roughly Primary Language Games (PLG's) and Secondary Language 
Games (SLG's) of the Inner and the Outer--see e.g., Johnston-‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ on how 
confusing the two is a major industry in philosophy and psychology (but it’s a universal mistake we all make), the 
impossibility of private language and the axiomatic structure of all behavior. Verbs like ‘thinking’, ‘seeing’ first 
described S1 functions but as S2 evolved they came to be applied to it as well, leading to the whole mythology of 
the inner resulting from  e.g., trying to refer to imagining as if it were seeing pictures inside the brain.  The PLG's 
are utterances by and descriptions of our involuntary, System 1, fast thinking, mirror neuron, true only, 
nonpropositional, mental states- our perceptions and memories and involuntary acts (including System 1 Truths 
and UOA1 (Understanding of Agency 1) and Emotions1- such as joy, love, anger) which can be described causally, 
while the evolutionarily later SLG's are expressions or descriptions of voluntary, System 2, slow thinking, 
mentalizing neurons, testable true or false, propositional, Truth2 and UOA2 and Emotions2- joyfulness, loving, 
hating, the dispositional (and often counterfactual) imagining, supposing, intending, thinking, knowing, believing, 
etc. which can only be described in terms of reasons (i.e., it's just a fact that attempts to describe System 2 in 
terms of neurochemistry, atomic physics, mathematics, just make no sense--see W for many examples and Searle 
for good disquisitions on this). 
It is not possible to describe the automatisms of System 1 in terms of reasons (e.g., `I see that as an apple 
because...') unless you want to give a reason in terms of EP, genetics, physiology, and as W has demonstrated 
repeatedly, it is meaningless to give "explanations" with the proviso that they will make sense in the future--they 
make sense now or never. 
 
A powerful heuristic is to separate behavior and experience into Intentionality 1 and Intentionality 2 (e.g., Thinking 
1 and Thinking 2, Emotions 1 and Emotions 2 etc.) and even into Truths 1 (T only axioms) and Truths 2 (empirical 
extensions or "Theorems" which result from the logical extension of Truths 1). W recognized that `Nothing is 
Hidden'--i.e., our whole psychology and all the answers to all philosophical questions are here in our language (our 
life) and that the difficulty is not to find the answers but to recognize them as always here in front of us--we just 
have to stop trying to look deeper. 
The true-only axioms, most thoroughly explored in 'On Certainty', are W's (and later S's) "bedrock" or 
"background" i.e., evolutionary psychology, which are traceable to the automated true-only reactions of bacteria 
and their descendants (e.g., humans), which evolved and operate by the mechanism of inclusive fitness (IF)--see 
Bourke's superb "Principles of Social Evolution". 
W insisted that we should regard our analysis of behavior as descriptions rather than 
explanations, but of course these too are complex language games and one person's description is another’s 
explanation. Beginning with their innate true-only, nonempirical (automated and nonchangeable) responses to the 
world, animals extend their axiomatic understanding via deductions into further true only understandings 
("theorems" as we might call them, but this is a complex language game even in the context of mathematics). 
Tyrannosaurs and mesons become as unchallengeable as the existence of our two hands or our breathing. This 
dramatically changes ones view of human nature. Theory of Mind (TOM) is not a theory at all but a group of true-
only Understandings of Agency (UOA --a term I devised 10 years ago) which newborn animals (including flies and 
worms if UOA is suitably defined) have and subsequently extend greatly (in higher eukaryotes). However, as I note 
here, W made it very clear that for much of intentionality there are System 1 and System 2 versions (language 
games)-the fast unconscious UOA1 and the Slow conscious UOA2 and of course these are heuristics for 
multifaceted phenomena. Although the raw material for S2 is S1, S2 also feeds back into S1— higher cortical 
feedback to the lowest levels of perception, memory, reflexive thinking that is a fundamental of psychology. Many 
of W’s examples explore this two way street (e.g., see the discussions of the duck/rabbit and ‘seeing as’ in 
Johnston).  
 
I think it is clear that the innate true-only axioms W is occupied with throughout his work, and almost exclusively in 
his last work `On Certainty', are equivalent to the fast thinking or System 1 that is at the center of current research 
(e.g., see Kahneman--"Thinking Fast and Slow", but he has no idea W laid out the framework some 75 years ago), 
which is involuntary and unconscious and which corresponds to the mental states of perception (including UOA1) 
and memory and involuntary acts, as W notes over and over in endless examples. One might call these 
"intracerebral reflexes"(maybe 99% of all our cerebration if measured by energy use in the brain). 
Our slow or reflective, more or less "conscious" (beware another network of language games!) second-self brain 
activity corresponds to what W characterized as "dispositions" or "inclinations", which refer to abilities or possible 
actions, are not mental states (or not in the same sense), and do not have any definite time of occurrence and/or 
duration. But disposition words like "knowing", "understanding", "thinking", "believing", which W discussed 
extensively, have at least two basic uses. One is a peculiar philosophical use (but graduating into everyday uses) 
which refers to the true-only sentences resulting from direct perceptions and memory, i.e., our innate axiomatic S1 
psychology (`I know these are my hands'), and the S2 one, which is their normal use as dispositions, which can be 
acted out, and which can become true or false (`I know my way home'). 
 
The investigation of involuntary fast thinking has revolutionized psychology, economics (e.g., Kahneman's Nobel 
prize) and other disciplines under names like "cognitive illusions", "priming", "framing", "heuristics" and "biases". 
Of course these too are language games so there will be more and less useful ways to use these words, and studies 
and discussions will vary from "pure" System 1 to combinations of 1 and 2 (the norm as W made clear), but 
presumably not ever of slow System 2 dispositional thinking only, since any System 2 thought or intentional action 
cannot occur without involving much of the intricate network of "cognitive modules", "inference engines", 
"intracerebral reflexes", "automatisms", "cognitive axioms", "background" or "bedrock" (as W and later Searle call 
our EP). 
 
Finally, let me suggest that with this perspective, W is not obscure, difficult or irrelevant but scintillating, profound 
and crystal clear, that he writes aphoristically and telegraphically because we think and behave that way, and that 
to miss him is to miss one of the greatest intellectual adventures possible. 
Now that we have a reasonable start on the Logical Structure of Rationality (the Descriptive Psychology of Higher 
Order Thought) laid out we can look at the table of Intentionality that results from this work, which I have 
constructed over the last few years. It is based on a much simpler one from Searle, which in turn owes much to 
Wittgenstein. I have also incorporated in modified form tables being used by current researchers in the psychology 
of thinking processes which are evidenced in the last 9 rows. It should prove interesting to compare it with those in 
Peter Hacker’s 3 recent volumes on Human Nature. I offer this table as an heuristic for describing behavior that I 
find more complete and useful than any other framework I have seen and not as a final or complete analysis, 
which would have to be three dimensional with hundreds (at least) of arrows going in many directions with many 
(perhaps all) pathways between S1 and S2 being bidirectional. Also, the very distinction between S1 and S2, 
cognition and willing, perception and memory, between feeling, knowing, believing and expecting etc. are 
arbitrary--that is, as W demonstrated, all words are contextually sensitive and most have several utterly different 
uses (meanings or COS). Many complex charts have been published by scientists but I find them of minimal utility 
when thinking about behavior (as opposed to thinking about brain function). Each level of description may be 
useful in certain contexts but I find that being coarser or finer limits usefulness.  
The Logical Structure of Rationality (LSR), or the Logical Structure of Mind (LSM), the Logical Structure of Behavior 
(LSB), the Logical Structure of Thought (LST), the Logical Structure of Consciousness (LSC), the Logical Structure of 
Personality (LSP), the Descriptive Psychology of Consciousness (DSC), the Descriptive Psychology of Higher Order 
Thought (DPHOT), Intentionality-the classical philosophical term. 
System 1 is involuntary, reflexive or automated “Rules” R1 while Thinking (Cognition) has no gaps and is 
voluntary or deliberative “Rules” R2  and Willing (Volition) has 3 gaps (see Searle) 
 
 Disposition* Emotion Memory Perception Desire PI** IA*** Action/Word 
Cause Originates 
From**** 
World World World World Mind Mind Mind Mind 
Causes Changes  
In***** 
None Mind Mind Mind None World World World 
Causally Self 
Reflexive****** 
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
True or False 
(Testable) 
Yes T only T only T only Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Public Conditions of 
Satisfaction 
 
Yes 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes/No 
 
No 
 
Yes/No 
 
Yes 
 
No 
 
Yes 
Describe a Mental 
State 
No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes/No Yes 
Evolutionary Priority 5 4 2,3 1 5 3 2 2 
Voluntary Content Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
Voluntary Initiation Yes/No No Yes No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive System 
******* 
2 1 2/1 1 2 / 1 2 1 2 
Change Intensity No Yes Yes Yes Yes No No No 
Precise Duration No Yes Yes Yes No No Yes Yes 
Time, Place(H+N,T+T) 
******** 
TT HN HN HN TT TT HN HN 
Special Quality No Yes No Yes No No No No 
Localized in Body No No No Yes No No No Yes 
Bodily Expressions Yes Yes No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Self Contradictions No Yes No No Yes No No No 
Needs a Self Yes Yes/No No No Yes No No No 
Needs Language Yes No No No No No No Yes/No 
 
FROM DECISION RESEARCH 
Subliminal Effects No Yes/No Yes Yes No No No Yes/No 
Associative/Rule Based RB A/RB A A A/RB RB RB RB 
Context 
Dependent/Abstract 
A CD/A CD CD CD/A A CD/A CD/A 
Serial/Parallel S S/P P P S/P S S S 
Heuristic/Analytic A H/A H H H/A A A A 
Needs Working 
Memory 
Yes No No No No Yes Yes Yes 
General Intelligence 
Dependent 
Yes No No No Yes/No Yes Yes Yes 
Cognitive Loading 
Inhibits 
Yes Yes/No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Arousal Facilitates or 
Inhibits 
I F/I F F I I I I 
 
 
Public Conditions of Satisfaction of S2 are often referred to by Searle and others as COS, Representations, 
truthmakers or meanings (or COS2 by myself), while the automatic results of S1 are designated as presentations by 
others ( or COS1 by myself). 
*            Aka Inclinations, Capabilities, Preferences, Representations, possible actions etc. 
**         Searle’s  Prior Intentions 
***       Searle’s Intention In Action 
****     Searle’s Direction of Fit 
*****   Searle’s Direction of Causation 
****** (Mental State instantiates--Causes or Fulfills Itself). Searle formerly called this causally self- referential. 
******* Tversky/Kahneman/Frederick/Evans/Stanovich defined cognitive systems. 
******** Here and Now or There and Then 
One should always keep in mind Wittgenstein’s discovery that after we have described the possible uses 
(meanings, truthmakers, Conditions of Satisfaction) of language in a particular context, we have exhausted its 
interest, and attempts at explanation (i.e., philosophy)  only get us further away from the truth.  It is critical to 
note that this table is only a highly simplified context-free heuristic and each use of a word must be examined in 
its context. The best examination of context variation is in Peter Hacker’s recent 3 volumes on Human Nature, 
which provide numerous tables and charts that should be compared with this one.  
Those wishing a comprehensive up to date account of Wittgenstein, Searle and their analysis of behavior from the 
modern two systems view may consult my article The Logical Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and 
Language as Revealed in Wittgenstein and Searle (2016). 
I have commented previously on Hutto in my review of his “Wittgenstein and the End of Philosophy.”  Probably the 
leading exponent of W’s ideas on the language games of inner and outer (the  ‘Two Selves’ operation of our 
personality or intentionality or EP etc. ) the prolific Daniel Hutto’s (DH) approach is called ‘Radical Enactivism’ and 
is well explained in numerous recent books and papers. It is a development of or version of the Embodied Mind 
ideas now current and, cleansed of its jargon, it is a straightforward extension of W’s 2
nd
 and 3
rd
 period writings 
(though Hutto seems only intermittently aware of this). He is also author of the best deconstructions I know of 
Dennett’s preposterous claim to be following in W’s footsteps (in fact Dennett is just repeating most of the classic 
mistakes in grandiose fashion and hasn’t a clue about W) and of Fodor’s LOT and other nonsense. But of course 
one must read Searle too and the title of his famous review of Dennett’s book says it well “Consciousness 
Explained Away”. Incidentally, unlike most philosophers and other scholars, who make little or no effort to give the 
general public access to their papers, Hutto has put nearly every paper (though of course often just proofs and not 
the final paper) free online at www.academia.edu. 
The basic idea of the Embodied Mind or Enactivism is that much of behavior is automated and does not involve 
representations (basically S2 dispositions-see Hutto’s lovely dissection of the ‘representation rats nest’ in his online 
papers above). To me this is just another way of stating the fact that System 1 precedes the operation of System 2 
which is a standard feature of contemporary psychology, which I have explained above and in further detail in my 
reviews of Wittgenstein (who was the first to see this and explored it in great detail) and Searle (who called it The 
Phenomenological Illusion in his superb essay of this name in his book Philosophy in a New Century which I have 
also reviewed). Since these are basic incontrovertible facts of animal behavior and I have already discussed them I 
won’t dwell on it here.   
This book is a sustained argument against other similar ways of describing behavior which he calls CEC and CIC in 
favor of REC (Radical Embodied Cognition), which he characterizes as “the strongest reading of the embodiment 
thesis—one that uncompromisingly maintains that basic cognition is literally constituted by, and to be understood 
in terms of concrete patterns of environmental situated organismic activity, nothing more or less” (p11). This is 
clear as a bell if you understand the two systems view explained above but likely opaque if you don’t.  Much 
clearer is Fodor’s characterization which he quotes as “abilities are prior to theories”, that “competence is prior to 
content” and that “knowing how is the paradigm cognitive state and it is prior to knowing that” (p10). That is, the 
unconscious automatisms of S1 are evolutionarily and behaviorally prior to the slow conscious dispositions of S2.   
This is classic Hutto high level philosophical dialog, which is quite elegant, but somewhat too dense and a tad 
pretentious for the rest of us.  I have not before encountered his coauthor Myin so can’t say how much of this text 
is really due to him. It is clear from this and the rest of Hutto’s work that (like everyone else) he has not quite kept 
up with the latest work in psychology nor really grasped the full power of W or S, even though he is one of the top 
Wittgensteinians alive and as bright as anyone in the field.  His discussions of the language games of “information” 
and “representation” in his other papers and books (and much else including his deconstructions of Dennett and 
Fodor) should be required reading for anyone interested in behavior. So, I have the greatest respect for him, but 
one hopes that he will mellow with time and write descriptions of behavior (i.e., all we can really do as 
philosophers according to W) in more mundane prose such as this lovely summation on p15. “Hence, REC is 
nothing less than a fundamental rethinking of the very foundations of  standard approaches to cognitive science 
and philosophy of mind.”  Yes and what a pity that this great Wittgensteinian (and everyone else) does not realize 
that W laid it all out with great (and unmatched) clarity in his third period works over 60 years ago.   
And again “By giving pride of place to embodied habits and skills when it comes to explaining how sophisticated 
mentality emerges, REC denies CIC accounts of the same. REC’s credo—that ‘we act before we think’ –is an 
outright denial of the CIC thesis that ‘we must think in order to act’”(p12). As noted above we are dealing here 
with the two senses of mentalizing verbs, or as I suggest Thinking 1 and Thinking 2.  If not identical with CIC, 
Phenomenology is at least quite similar and so one really ought to read Searle’s “The Phenomenological Illusion” at 
this point and of course all of W3(third period W) but there is no hint of this here.  Finally, for anyone who still is 
confused “Enactivists are concerned to defend the view that our most elementary ways of engaging with the world 
and others—including our basic forms of perception and perceptual experience—are mindful in the sense of being 
phenomenally charged and intentionally directed, despite being non-representational and content free. Defending 
this understanding of basic mentality is the primary aim of this book” (p13). 
This leads to his accepting Dretske’s idea that experiencing things (i.e., qualia such as redness) is (in my terms) a 
representational function of S2—i.e., dispositional (propositional) and hence true or false and conscious and slow, 
in contrast to S1 which is reflexive, non-representational, fast and true only.  
Throughout Chap 3 he promotes the fast automated reflexive behaviors of S1 (i.e., REC) over the representational, 
content possessing ones of S2 (i.e., instructionalism or intellectualism), but never quite gets around to using this 
common modern terminology. E.G., p49 top and p50 bottom.   As always, one must be constantly aware of the 
quite different language games played with ‘conscious’, ‘cognitive’, reflexive, ‘representation’, ’information’, 
’computation’, ‘subpersonal’, ‘automatic’, ‘contents’, ‘function’, etc., which are typically used by both pros and 
amateurs as if their meanings were uniform and obvious. As one digs into the discussion on p59 et seq. it is good 
to have in mind Searle’s lucid differentiations of observer independent intrinsic intentionality and functions that 
conscious creatures have, vs. observer dependent ascribed intentionality and functions which we may attribute to 
the rest of nature (for a capsule summary see my recent review of his Philosophy in a New Century, which also 
delves into the related issues of ‘syntax is not semantics’ and ‘structure (e.g., regularity) is not syntax’).  
Inevitably we run into the multifarious LG’s of ‘information’ (p62 etc.) which has drastically different uses and 
often refers to the true only (not really info bearing in the normal sense) non-propositional mechanisms of S1, but 
is commonly taken to mean the true or false content bearing propositional statements of S2 which is what he says 
flat out on p67. Naturally he quotes Dretske’s classic book on this. It seems Dretske’s most recent article on info is 
in the 30th Intl. Wittgenstein Symposium, which you can page capture and print direct from Amazon or Google 
Books, but it’s got little to say, and the main reason to view that volume is to get Rodych’s latest article on W’s 
mathematics.  H&M recommend giving up on info as content and adhering to info as covariance so that one can 
distinguish info processing “action oriented representations” (i.e., S2 higher order dispositional thought) from info 
sensitive (i.e., S1 reflexive response).   If contentful properties can’t be reduced to physical properties then “…the 
explanatory project of naturalism with respect to them would be quite different—it would be to discover the set of 
fundamental bridging laws that explain how contentful properties relate to basic physical properties.  That would 
be the only way to solve what we might call the Hard Problem of Content.” Yes we all want to know how S1 
(teleosemiotics) gives rise to S2 (teleosemantic intensionality) or, to put it another way, mind arises from matter. 
They quote Jacobs: “In all of these cases it is not unreasonable to assume that the informational relation holds 
between an indicator and what it indicates (or a source) independently of the presence of an agent with 
propositional attitudes”. Mindful of S’s classic discussions, we realize that Jacobs is talking about derived 
intentionality and hence concepts of info that have nothing to do with human behavior. So they are forced to 
conclude that “There is no naturally occurring contentful information that can be “used and fused” to from inner 
representations. Unless we assume that pre-existing contents exist to be received through sensory contact, the 
last thread of the analogy between basic cognitive systems and genuinely communications systems breaks down at 
a crucial point.(p70)” 
And once again:  ”Taking an even stronger line on this holds that the interpretative response does all the work. 
This would surrender any commitment to the idea that informational content exists independently of the activities 
of cognitive agents.”(p74)  Quite so! And so vanish Fodorian qualms about Darwin (p80) and his and Strawson’s 
Hyperintellectualism (p90).  
That is, no bridge from S1 to S2 at least via info.  How about some Wittgensteinian therapy here?  “Here we come 
up against a remarkable and characteristic phenomenon in philosophical investigation: the difficulty---I might 
say---is not that of finding the solution but rather that of recognizing as the solution something that looks as if it 
were only a preliminary to it.”  Zettel p312 
But if we accept that the simple explanations we can give now are the only ones possible, what about 
philosophy and neurophysiology?  Nothing about them—they will ever long for a completion they cannot attain. 
At least this is my take on things. 
And finally: “This is to accept that organisms often act successfully by making appropriate responses to objects 
or states of affairs in ways that are only mediated by their sensitive responding to natural signs, where this 
responding does not involve contentfully representing the objects or states of affairs in question (p81).”  In my 
words, the automatic unconscious reflexive operation of S1 undergirds all behavior.  When they note that 
perceptual experiences (i.e., S1 mental states) “…do not attribute properties to the world.  Consequently they 
do not have built in conditions of satisfaction, nor do they possess veridical content, possess content that is true 
or false.” These true only S1 qualities ensuing from our axiomatic psychology, and their generation of the higher 
order thought of S2, are exactly what W discoursed upon so brilliantly at the end of his life (but it seems H&M, 
along with everyone else, have no idea).  
Not only does the idea that the mental perceptual states of S1 are conceptual get the boot, but they might claim 
that “…the very nature of such perceptual content debars the possibility of ever fully or exhaustively capturing 
its essence by means of conceptual descriptive characterization (p97).” Inner states are what they are and since 
there is no private language and no way in the public one to describe them in a really satisfying way-- they will 
always remain “qualia”.  But I think ( and am pretty sure W would take the view) that “stabbing pain”, “bright 
red”, “green apple tree” and “galloping horses” are as good as it gets—that is, there is no useful meaning that 
can ever be given to “exhaustively capturing its essence”.  As good as H&M are, I am afraid they have fallen into 
the classic philosopher’s trap so beautifully described by W.  They reach the limits of language, so naturally they  
want to go beyond them. One can say or write anything, but one cannot mean anything.  Must it not be either 
true or false that 7432 occurs in the decimal expansion of PI? As W showed, your intuition often leads you 
astray.  
Before reading the next few pages on Gauker’s Assumptions and nonintensional, nonpropositional, 
nonconceptual “content” (i.e., S1) it will be useful to read Searle’s old paper on unconscious intentionality (Phil 
Issues 1:45-66(1991)) which shows how S1 generates S2 “…the ontology of the unconscious is strictly the 
ontology of a neurophysiology capable of generating the conscious” as well as Johnston’s classic book 
‘Wittgenstein: Rethinking the Inner’ (or at least my review of it)-- especially the material on indeterminacy of 
language.  And of course to the list of those rejecting the propositionality of perception one should add W who 
anticipated them in detail by some 60 years and provided in his last period the good news (to balance the bad 
on p103) that S1 is the true-only axiomatic foundation of S2—that is, of all higher order behavior and so of 
course these aliefs are not revisable (p104, 105). And, since  S1 is prelinguistic, it is hardly surprising that there 
“…is no conceptual content of perception to express”(p100).   
They are much exercised in Chap 6 to show that perceptual science, and illusions in particular, provide no 
evidence of representations or content in S1 and I applaud their conclusion that “…it is not clear what 
‘possessing content’ really amounts to, or what work it is meant to do that couldn’t be done just as easily by 
assuming that human beings share basic and content-free ways of responding directly to certain worldly 
solicitations and offerings.” That is, S1 is automated as modern biology and psychology shows.  
I have much less sympathy for the extended and scaffolded minds of Chap 7. I don’t see how one can lay the 
burden of explaining how the mind works at Searle’s door, nor how the convoluted prose about “decoupled 
contentful activities” etc. helps at all. Why not just say that automated unconscious prelinguistic S1 feeds 
deliberate, conscious linguistic S2, which is axiomatically extended by public language into the myriad wonders 
of culture?  Beginning and end of story.   
Their last chapter is about “regaining consciousness,” but I would say that if one has understood Wittgenstein 
and Searle, one has never lost it.  And, though this is an excellent book by two of the brightest and the best, I 
suggest mulling over my thoughts in this and other reviews and reading Johnston and the latest from Searle, 
along of course with as much of 3
rd
 period W as feasible, is an even better filter for folly. 
His second book with Myin ‘Evolving Enactivism’ will appear in 2017 and I have ordered my copy almost a year 
in advance.  
 
 
 
 
